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I. INTRODUCTION
In the same year that Gary Schwartz commented en passant on the Supreme
Court as a products liability court,' Mary Davis published The Supreme Court and
* Sam Nunn Professor ofLaw, Emory University. My thanks to Lawrence Witner for thoughtful
research assistance and to Leslie Griffin for helpful editorial comments.
1. See Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the ProperFederalRole in American Tort Law, 38 Apdz.
L. REV. 917, 944-45 (1996).
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Our Culture ofIrresponsibility, the definitive article on this topic.2 Professor Davis
attacked the Court for encouraging "irresponsibility by creating new common-law
immunities, creatively extending old ones, and interpreting Congress's intent to
federalize these immunities."3 The Supreme Court, according to her critique, has
been blunting and thwarting strict liability.4 Business interests demand that they are
entitled, in the name of efficiency, to know that the legal system will cut off their
liability for the harms they cause. Docile in the face of this demand, the Court has
federalized products liability law.
Customarily, a law review article that begins by referring to another law review
article has a critical agenda. On this occasion of tribute to a departed colleague, I
intend something friendlier. My revisit to Irresponsibility, with Gary Schwartz in
mind, will take a constructive tack: Yes, Professor Davis is right, but what else
should be said about the Supreme Court as a products liability court? Sheltering
business defendants from common-law liability has been only a fraction of a bigger
story.
Associating this agenda with our honoree requires a bit of disclosure at the
outset. Although I will guardedly pay tribute to the Supreme Court as a products
liability court, Gary wrote that he didn't think much of it.5 Nor was he inclined to
mix products liability and "culture," as Davis does in her title, manifesting a taste
that I share.
6
Nevertheless this venture does proceed very much in memory of Gary
Schwartz. I write remembering-and trying to evoke-a colleague who eschewed
overt politics, published no trenchant criticism of any institution like the Davis
indictment of the Supreme Court, and tended to believe that the truth is what falls
between two extreme stances. As a scholar, this colleague had a taste for primary
materials: case law when talking about what courts do, statutes when evaluating
legislative schemes, and hard facts when describing how accidents and risks
materialize.7 The occasion of tribute impels me to look at a topic that Gary would
think about from time to time, in a centrist perspective. Perhaps needless to add,
this Essay does not undertake to do any of the work of Gary Schwartz. No self-
2. See Mary J. Davis, The Supreme Court and Our Culture ofIrresponsibility, 31 WAKEFOREST
L. REv. 1075 (1996). The other significant publication about the Supreme Court as a products liability
court is RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS 4-5 (1988) (commending the Supreme Court
as a force in the development of products liability and arguing that unless the Court assumes
leadership in this area, products liability will be riven by factionalism among the states).
3. Davis, supra note 2, at 1076.
4. Id. at 1077-81, 1135-38.
5. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 945-46.
6. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, Formed by Thalidomide: Mass Torts as a False Curefor Toxic
Exposure, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2153, 2156-57 (1997) (exploring thalidomide as a "signifier"); Anita
Bernstein & Paul Fanning, Heirs ofLeonardo: Cultural Obstacles to StrictProducts Liability in Italy,
27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 2-5 (1994) (proposing that Italian national culture is averse to strict
products liability).
7. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC
PRINCIPLES) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001) (mentioning, in the Reporters' Notes, extensive reliance
on primary materials).
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designated successor can imitate, synthesize, or add to this unique corpus of
scholarship by derivative means. All that this Essay can express is its appreciation.
Our severe collegial loss will only be mourned and commemorated, never repaired.
I. PLACING THE SUPREME COURT AMONG THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY COURTS OF
THE UNITED STATES
A. Products Liability Leadership from a Small Number ofAmerican Courts
It's easy to name the leading products liability court in the United States. Even
its relatively minor precedents-Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co.,' Ray v. Alad
Corp.,9andDaly v. GeneralMotors Corp., 0 for instance-made important new law.
As Gary Schwartz noted, the California Supreme Court established itself as
preeminent on the subject of design defect by virtue of its decisions published "in
1970, 1972, 1978, 1982, and 1994."" Before these five decisions were
published-indeed, before design defect emerged as a distinct concept-the
California Supreme Court stood astride all of products liability when it announced
strict liability in tort for a product-caused injury in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc.; a concurrence by Roger Traynor, published in 1944, hadpresaged
the acceptance of strict products liability throughout most of the nation. 3 From his
vantage point at Berkeley and later at Hastings, inside the state and working
alongside Traynor, William Prosser observed and helped to solidify the
development of strict products liability.'4
Prosser's "Citadel" articles are closely associated with the decision, and then
the reception, ofHenningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 15 and New Jersey remains
8. 59 P.2d 144, 148 (Cal. 1936) (establishing "the foreign-natural test" for claims against food
suppliers), overruled by Mexicali Rose v. Superior Court, 822 P.2d 1292 (Cal. 1992).
9. 560 P.2d 3, 11 (Cal. 1977) (imposing strict liability on a successor corporation that continues
to manufacture the same product line of which the injurious product was a part, even if the successor
corporation did not purchase all or most of the assets of the predecessor).
10. 575 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Cal. 1978) (adopting comparative negligence as a defense against
strict products liability claims).
11. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 946.
12. 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963)
13. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
14. See William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966); William L. Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18
HASTINGS L.J. 9 (1966).
15. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). See generally George L. Priest, Commentary in Fred R. Shapiro,
The Most-CitedArticlesfrom The Yale Law Journal, 100 YALEL.J. 1449, 1471 (1991) ("Prosser had
been predicting the imminent demise of warranty law and the adoption of strict products liability as
part of his propaganda ... for almost two decades. And in Assault Upon the Citadel he finally got
lucky," when courts began to agree with him.).
2002] 1195
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
a competitor with California for recognition as a leading products liability court.'6
Following its strong role in the formation of modem products liability in 1960,
"[t]he New Jersey Supreme Court has led the nation in pushing back the frontiers"
in this field. 7 For example, Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp. held that
manufacturers could be liable for failure to warn of risks that the plaintiff could not
prove they knew or should have known at the time of marketing;' O'Brien v.
Muskin Corp. permitted plaintiffs to declare an entire product category defective;' 9
and Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. announced that pharmaceutical sellers may
have a duty to warn patients directly, contrary to the no-duty learned intermediary
rule.20 In 1965 alone, the New Jersey Supreme Court proclaimed three expansions
of strict products liability. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc. gave plaintiffs
generous remedies for economic loss. 2' Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc. applied strict
products liability to defects in real estate.22 Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing &
Rental Service extended strict liability beyond sellers to lessors of commercial
property.'
New York warrants mention here too, not only for its extraordinary
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.24 but also for its decisional law in the latter
decades of the twentieth century. By way of contrast to California and New Jersey,
pro-plaintiff innovators in products liability,' historian William Nelson has
described New York as a conservative, even stodgy, products liability venue for
several decades after MacPherson, coming into its own only in hesitant steps
beginning in the late 1950s. 26 Codling v. Paglia,27 decided in 1973, according to
Nelson, was a landmark-the first products liability case where the Court of
16. See George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability?, 109 YALE L.J. 1087, 1091-92 (2000) (praising the New Jersey and California
Supreme Courts for their "judicial innovation" toward strengthening "tort law as a tool for consumer
protection").
17. Aaron D. Twerski, A Moderate and Restrained Federal Product Liability Bill: Targeting
the Crisis Areas for Resolution, 18 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 575, 586 (1985).
18. 447 A.2d 539, 547 (N.J. 1982).
19. 463 A.2d 298, 306 (N.J. 1983), superseded in part by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3 (West
2000), as recognized in Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239 (N.J. 1990).
20. 734 A.2d 1245, 1253 (N.J. 1999).
21. 207 A.2d 305, 313-14 (N.J. 1965).
22. 207 A.2d 314, 325 (N.J. 1965).
23. 212 A.2d 769, 781 (N.J. 1965).
24. 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916) (holding that lack of privity was no longer a barrier
between a plaintiff seeking to recover in negligence from a product manufacturer).
25. See Frances E. Zollers et al., Looking Backward, Looking Forward: Reflections on Twenty
Years of Products Liability Reform, 50 SYRACUSE L. Rv. 1019, 1042 (2000) (noting that the high
courts of California and New Jersey, famed for pro-plaintiff decisional law, have more recently
attracted attention for pro-defendant decisions).
26. William E. Nelson, From Fairness to Efficiency: The Transformation of Tort Law in New
York, 1920-1980, 47 BUFF. L. Rv. 117, 181-94 (1999).
27. 298 N.E. 2d 622 (N.Y. 1973).
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Appeals announced both its intention to engage in overt policymaking and its
commitment to efficiency as a policy.28
Recent decades put the New York courts back on the products liability map.
The New York Court of Appeals has published especially influential DES
decisions." Federal courts inNew York, often applying judge-made New York law,
have left a strong mark on products liability. Guido Calabresi, famed as a scholar
of accident law beforejoining the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, has
published extensive decisional law on products liability.30 Judge Jack Weinstein of
the Eastern District of New York has issued innovative decisions in cases involving
many of the most notorious products marketed in the United States-Agent Orange,
DES, and handguns-and has weighed in on other products-related controversies
such as repetitive-motion injury and liability where the plaintiff cannot identify the
manufacturer of an injurious product.31 Contemporary scholars continue to regard
New York as a source of provocative decisional law in products liability.32
B. Enter the United States Supreme Court
Along with the highest courts of California, New Jersey, and New York and
perhaps a couple of the federal courts of appeals,33 the United States Supreme Court
28. Nelson, supra note 26, at 190.
29. See Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198, 199 (N.Y. 1991) (rejecting claim by a DES
granddaughter); Hymovitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y. 1989) (accepting market
share liability).
30. See Castro v. QVC Network, Inc., 139 F.3d ll4passim (2d Cir. 1998); Liriano v. Hobart
Corp., 132 F.3d 124passim (2d Cir. 1998); McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 157-75 (2d Cir.
1997) (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
31. Forapartial sampling, see Geressy v. Digital Equip. Corp., 980 F. Supp. 640,641 (E.D.N.Y.
1997) (repetitive-motion injury); Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1308 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
(handguns); Braune v. Abbott Labs., 895 F. Supp. 530,531 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (DES); Hall v. E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 378-80 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (burden-shifting on causation).
The various Agent Orange opinions are too numerous to cite. See generally PETERH. SCHUCK, AGENT
ORANGE ON TRIAL 111-42 (1986) (describing Judge Weinstein's pivotal role in the litigation).
32. See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye & Kenneth I. Weissman, Interactive JudicialFederalism: Certified
Questions in New York, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 373, 399 (2000) (describing products liability as a
"particularly fruitful area" in New York certification); Jerry J. Phillips, The Unreasonably Unsafe
Product and Strict Liability, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 129, 158-59 (1996) (discussing Denny v. Ford
Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730 (N.Y. 1995)).
33. Gary Schwartz remarked on the contributions of federal appellatejudges to products liability
doctrine. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 936. The old, pre-split Fifth Circuit would be a contender
among the circuit courts of appeals, for bestowing on us Borelv. FibreboardPaperProds. Corp., 493
F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), "providing the framework of asbestos litigation," and Reyes v. Wyeth Labs.,
Inc., 498 F.2d 1264 (Sth Cir. 1974), "broadening the liability of the producers ofvaccines." Id. at 935-
36. The vast Ninth Circuit is a presence as well. See generally Michael C. Polentz, Comment, Post-
Daubert Confusion with Expert Testimony, 36 SANTA CLARAL. REv. 1187, 1211 (1996) (discussing
the tension between two important Ninth Circuit decisions, Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 F.3d
1116 (9th Cir. 1994), and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995)
(Daubert I1)). Each summer the Quinnipiac Law Review publishes a survey of the year's products
liability decisions by the Second Circuit. See Eric D. Daniels, Reviewof2000Second CircuitProducts
Liability Cases, 21 QrtNIPIAc L. REV. 51 (2001).
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is a products liability court. Readers of its jurisprudence might debate when exactly
the Court earned this designation. In Irresponsibility, Davis wrote that the Court
did not publish a products liability decision until 1986,34 when it addressed
economic loss inEastRiver Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc..3s Until
some duly empowered authority determines which characteristics make a case a
products liability case, naming those decisions that comprise the Supreme Court's
products liability contribution will remain a matter of opinion, as it were.36 We have
no official compilation. To derive my own list for this Essay, I started by casting a
wide net into Supreme Court decisional law.
Several questionable cases swam in. For instance, what to do with the 1890
decision of Detroit v. Osborne,37 whose first sentence speaks a products liability
buzzword? "On November 19, 1883," Justice Brewer begins, "the defendant in
error, while walking on Church Street, in the city of Detroit, was thrown to the
ground and received severe personal injuries in consequence of a defect in the
sidewalk."3 I do not think a sidewalk is a product, especially for purposes of
determining the liability ofamunicipality (that is, rather than a commercial seller),39
and so I tossed Detroit v. Osborne from the roster. Others have disagreed about
sidewalks, however.4" Ultimately it seemed to me that the entire nineteenth century
yields only anachronistic references to this famed innovation of the middle
twentieth. Continuing into post-industrial case law, I decided to insist on decisions
in which (1) the plaintiff attributed personal injury or property damage to an item
marketed in commerce and (2) the opinion for the Court paid at least a little
attention to the injury and its connection to a product, so that the presence of
"products liability" was not entirely incidental to the decision. This second criterion
eliminated several cases, starting with some that reached the Court through the
34. 476 U.S. 858 (1986) [hereinafter East River].
35. See Davis, supra note 2, at 1079 & n.21 (calling East River the Court's "first meaningful
foray into products liability"). See also Michael D. Green & Richard A. Matasar, The Supreme Court
and the Products Liability Crisis: Lessons from Boyle's Government ContractorDefense, 63 S. CAL.
L. REv. 637, 639 & n.1 (1990) (calling products liability in the Supreme Court "virtually nonexistent"
until East River).
36. See Anita Bernstein, How Can a Product Be Liable?, 45 DuKEL.J. 1, 3-4 (1995) (noting the
fundamental question of definition).
37. 135 U.S. 492 (1890).
38. Id. at 495 (emphasis added).
39. See Bernstein, supra note 36, at 61-64 (proposing that in order for "products liability" to be
present, a user must have exercised a choice).
40. In Truglio v. Hayes Constr. Co., 785 A.2d 1153, 1156 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001), the parties
litigated the question of sidewalk-as-product by disputing the centrality of construction techniques,
a "service," in the fashioning of the sidewalk. The court concluded that the sidewalk was not a
product. Id. at 1160. See also Engelhardt v. Rogers Group, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 757, 759-60 (E.D.
Ark. 2001) (holding that a public highway is not a product); Leong v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 970 P.2d
972, 979 (Haw. 1998) (permitting strict products liability claim for injuries suffered on an escalator
used by the public in a retail store); Harrington v. LaBelle's of Colorado, Inc., 765 P.2d 732, 735
(Mont. 1988) (holding that a speed bump is not a product), rev'd on other grounds Pierce v. ALSC
Architects, 890 P.2d 1254 (Mont. 1995).
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maritime route,4 and later excluding products liability litigation that focused
exclusively on issues unrelated to products liability.4'
By these criteria, East River enters not first, but merely early in an ongoing
show. The Supreme Court's first products liability case is probably Dalehite v.
United States, a 1953 decision aboutthe application ofthe Federal Tort Claims Act
for injuries arising out of a fertilizer explosion.43 In Italia Societa per Azioni di
Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., decided in 1964, the Court for the first
time cited a products liability treatise; the decision itself, permitting indemnity for
a personal injury action based on the defendant's shipment of defective rope, meets
my criteria to join the products liability list."4 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson is the first Supreme Court case that the Court expressly labeled "a
products-liability action;" it was decided in 1980. 45 By my reckoning the Supreme
Court also decided two other products liability cases before East River: Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,46 on forum non conveniens, and McDonough Power
Equipment, Inc., v. Greenwood,47 on jury selection criteria. My list goes on to
include a total of twenty-five decisions, running from Dalehite a half-century ago
to Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs'Legal Committee,4 ' decided in 2001.
Many of the Court's twenty-five cases relate only peripherally to the issues that
Mary Davis and I and other specialists care about, especially the central problem
of how to identify "defect" in a product that has caused injury. The Supreme Court
could never produce a corpus of products liability jurisprudence like that of
California or New Jersey. Even assuming that the Court has the capacity to build
the law of accident liability, a point on which Gary Schwartz expressed
skepticism,49 its mandate to address procedural fairness and to find limits in
government powers necessarily turns away from the content of common-law rules."0
The hardcore products liability enthusiasts might start to fidget, but even they
would identify the Supreme Court as a products liability court. As a review of the
Appendix will show, more than half of the twenty-five products liability decisions
41. See Kermarec v. Compagnie Gen. Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959); Pope & Talbot, Inc.
v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648 (1953).
42. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 369-70 (198 1) (holding that
an order denying a motion to disqualify the opposing party's counsel is not appealable under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 after allegations of a defect in multipiece truck tire rims); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,
446 U.S. 740, 741 (1980) (addressing the relationbetween state statute oflimitations and Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 3; the complaint alleged that a defect in a nail caused the nail to shatter and hit
plaintiff in the eye).
43. 346 U.S. 15, 17 (1953).
44. 376 U.S. 315, 324 (1964). See, e.g., id. at 319 n.4 (citing 2 Louis R. FRUMER & MELVIN I.
FRIEDMAN. PRODucrs LtABLrry § 10.01 (1960)).
45. 444 U.S. 286, 287 (1980).
46. 454 U.S. 235, 238 (1981).
47. 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984).
48. 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
49. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 946.
50. Cf BMW of North Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 607 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(objecting to the Court's meddling in state tort litigation).
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appear of interest to readers who specialize in products liability. This showing is
substantial. Few courts in the United States have had this much to say about
products liability.
III. THE SUPREME COURT AND OUR CULTURE OF IRRESPONSIBILITY'S THESIS
RECONSIDERED: A SECOND LOOK AT FOUR CASES
The thesis of The Supreme Court and Our Culture ofIrresponsibility rests on
Davis's extrapolations from three Supreme Court decisions in addition to East
River': Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,52 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 53
andMedtronic, Inc. v. Lohr 4 This Partretums to Davis's four cases, exploring how
they have fared and what they have wrought in the years following the 1996
publication of Irresponsibility. Although much of the Davis critique remains
compelling, I see a landscape less bleak and monolithic than what Irresponsibility
reported.
A. East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.
The Supreme Court's leading economic-loss decision arose from the
malfunctioning of turbine engines that Delaval, Inc. supplied to a series of corporate
entities in the shipping industry." Four subsidiaries of Seatrain Lines, Inc., each
possessing a ship under "a bareboat charter, by which it took full control of the ship
for 20 or 22 years as though it owned it," eventually became the East River
petitioners. These chartering companies suffered economic loss when the engines
malfunctioned: they were obliged to pay for the repair of the engines, and when the
ships were out of service, the charterers lost revenue.57 The plaintiffs alleged the
engines were defectively designed, and sought to recover in tort for the value of the
engines and for their economic loss generally. 8
This tort claim encountered rejection from all of the numerous federal judges
who heard it. The District Court for the District of New Jersey entered summary
judgment in favor of Delaval.59 Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit affirmed. ° Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Blackmun declared that
the charterers could not recover in tort.61 Destruction of these engines, the Court
51. Davis, supra note 2.
52. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
53. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
54. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
55. 476 U.S. 858, 859 (1986).
56. Id. at 860.
57. Id. at 861.
58. Id. at 861-62.
59. Id. at 862.
60. East River S.S. Corp. v. Delaval Turbine, Inc., 752 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1985) aff'd sub nom.
East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
61. East River, 476 U.S. at 875-76.
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held, could be the basis of only an economic loss claim-because no person, nor
property beyond the engines themselves, was harmed-and the Court saw no reason
to approve the awarding of economic loss damages in tort to aparty that could have
reallocated the relevant risks by contract.62 Using a briny metaphor fitted to the
admiralty docket, the Court fretted that if modem products liability were
encouraged to entertain economic-loss claims without regard for the strictures of
warranty, "contract law would drown in a sea of tort."'63
Davis concedes that the holding of East River does not trouble her much, but
she expresses several objections to passages in the opinion for the Court." The
Court purported to reject a contrary or "minority" view, identified with Santor v.
A & MKaragheusian, Inc.,65 that would have permitted recovery for the lost value
of the self-destroyed product; Justice Blackmnn declared that this approach "fails
to account for the need to keep products liability and contract law in separate
spheres and to maintain a realistic limitation on damages. 66 To Davis, this "need"
is far from compelling. The whole point of modem products liability since
MacPherson andHenningsen, she notes, has been to move product-caused damage
away from the repressive confines of contract law and acknowledge the nexus
between products liability and tort principles.67 Any need "to maintain a realistic
limitation on damages" is simply a boon to defendants, unconnected to the policies
of products liability law. Contract-thinking drains out of products liability its
primary concern about danger that victims can never perfectly predict: "The
Court," as Davis puts the point, "begins to create the perception that irresponsible
product manufacture is acceptable when the victim is in a position to insure against
it."2
63
This reading of East River makes much of dicta, to the neglect of the opinion
as a whole. East River tells a story of disappointment and financial loss that befell
investors when they encountered a defective product in a commercial transaction.
Delaval, Inc. carried out its unfortunate engine-installation business in a series of
dealings with a subsidiary, a parent corporation, a trustee, a charterer, and then the
petitioners, another set of subsidiaries. These amply capitalized parties had no
particular claim to the solicitude of Traynorian policy engineering. Davis is right
to declare that because questions of duty should be kept distinct from questions of
damages, the Court should have cast its holding as disallowing economic-loss
damages rather than imply, as it did, that this supplier breached no duty when it
rendered a defective product in commerce.69 But the point is quibble-sized. The
central fact of East River is its economic-loss claim, which was brought by one set
of business litigants against a corporate adversary of equal sophistication and
62. Id. at 872-73.
63. Id. at 866.
64. Davis, supra note 2, at 1085-86.
65. 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965).
66. East River, 476 U.S. at 870-71.
67. Davis, supra note 2, at 1082-83.
68. Id. at 1085.
69. Id. at 1083-84.
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bargaining power.70  Davis's concerns about permitting Contract to regain its
nineteenth-century domination over the kinder and better qualified Tort
notwithstanding, the Blackmun opinion repeatedly emphasizes that it wishes to say
nothing about safety, consumers, or personal injury. With great approval Justice
Blackmun cites the Traynor concurrence in Escola (twice) and refers to
MacPherson as having described "[t]he paradigmatic products-liability action," a
claim involving a commercial good "reasonably certain to place life and limb in
peril."'M East River shows no desire to roll back the central gains that modem
products liability offers plaintiffs.72 Its interest in contract law is to delineate one
sphere away from the center of products liability, not to supersede tort's
preoccupations with safety.
Moving to the effects of East River on subsequent case law, Davis mentions
two developments. First, although the states are free to ignore a Supreme Court
precedent that came from the admiralty route, many state supreme courts after 1986
did not ignore East River, holding that pure economic loss or damage to a product
itself was not recoverable in tort-based products liability actions pleaded as torts.73
This development in state law is troublesome only to the extent that the East River
holding is troublesome, and it gets feebler when one decides not to worry much
about economic loss in general, or about the business losses of corporate plaintiffs
in particular.74
Davis's second concern, classified under a heading called "The culture of
irresponsibility illustrated, ' 75 is that the U.S. District Court for the District of
Colorado chose to follow East River in Richard O'Brien Cos. v. Challenge-Cook
Bros., Inc.,76 a 1987 diversity case, even though the Colorado Supreme Court had
held in a 1975 decision, Hiigel v. General Motors Corp.,77 that pure economic loss
was recoverable in tort.7' Like Davis, I understand the Erie doctrine to require the
Colorado federal district court to follow Colorado state precedent rather than a
contrary holding from a Supreme Court admiralty opinion. Colorado businesses
should not have the rules switched on them without warning unless there is a good
70. Id. at 1085.
71. East River, 476 U.S. at 866-67.
72. Indeed, not every potential plaintiff is rendered worse off by the characterization of
economic-loss claims as breaches of contract or warranty, rather than as torts. In some circumstances,
the warranty statute of limitation gives the plaintiff time to sue when tort claims would be time-barred.
See, e.g., Bancorp Leasing & Fin. Corp. v. Agusta Aviation Corp., 813 F.2d 272, 276-77 (9th Cir.
1987) (presenting an economic-loss claim that the plaintiff preferred to characterize as a breach of
warranty, for this reason).
73. Davis, supra note 2, at 1086-90.
74. Cf. Bocre Leasing Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 645 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 1995) ("Tort
law should not be bent so far out of its traditional progressive path and discipline by alloving tort
lawsuits where the claims at issue are, fundamentally and in all relevant respects, essentially
contractual, product-failure controversies.").
75. Davis, supra note 2, at 1090.
76. 672 F. Supp. 466 (D. Colo. 1987).
77. 544 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1975).
78. Davis, supra note 2, at 1090-91.
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reason to switch; the plaintiff, reasonably believing itself swaddled in plaintiff-
favoring state precedent, was entitled to relax a little in its contract negotiation with
the defendant. But it is hard to see Richard O'Brien Cos. as a dire portent of the
culture of irresponsibility, especially since the decision makes a point of
emphasizing that Mr. Hiigel had been "an individual, noncommercial plaintiff,"79
presumably someone Davis would deem more entitled than Richard O'Brien Cos.
to judicial protection. Perhaps Judge Kane chose the path of "irresponsibility" in
following East River rather than Hiigel-or, as he preferred to put it, "restrict[ing]
the decision in Hiigel to its particular facts.""0 But he is hardly the first judicial
author of a products liability decision to approach precedent with less than obedient
awe." He was not even the first federal judge to resolve a conflict between East
River and state precedent by favoring East River.8" As with Davis's first concern,
this development is deplorable only to the extent that the East River holding is
deplorable.
Cases decided after the publication of Irresponsibility reveal developments
likely to hearten Professor Davis. First, and most significant, of these decisions is
Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., where the Supreme Court ruled 6-3
in favor of the plaintiff in a products liability claim for property damage.8 3 The
Court held that damage to a boat was not damage to "the product itself' because
equipment added subsequently to the boat by an intervening 9wner constituted
"other property"---what was damaged was not the boat itself, according to the
Court.84 Perhaps aware of biavis's worry about generous new immunities, Justice
Breyer, writing for the majority, remarked that to preclude repurchasers like the
plaintiff from recovering for mischief that earlier purchasers had done to the
product would be a bad idea because it would foster "tort damage immunity beyond
that set by any relevant tort precedent."8" This "other property" rationale underlies
several post-East River cases decided in favor of plaintiffs.86 As for the concern
79. 672 F. Supp. at 472.
80. Id.
81. The New Jersey Supreme Court, famed for innovation, has veered from stare decisis in its
products liability case law. See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text; see also Feldman v. Lederle
Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 387-88 (N.J. 1984) (overruling Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447
A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982) with "We do not overrule Beshada, but restrict Beshada to the circumstances
giving rise to its holding"); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 94 (N.J. 1960)
(rewriting rules about privity and disclaimers: "The task of the judiciary is to administer the spirit as
well as the letter of the law... [P]art of that burden is to protect the ordinary man against the loss of
important rights through what, in effect, is the unilateral act of the manufacturer.").
82. See Aloe Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 816 F.2d 110, 119 (3d Cir. 1987).
83. 520 U.S. 875, 875-76 (1997).
84. Id. at 884-85.
85. Id. at 880.
86. See Transco Syndicate No. 1, Ltd. v. Bollinger Shipyards, Inc., 1 F. Supp. 2d 608, 613 (E.D.
La. 1998); Comptech Int'l, Inc. v. Milam Commerce Park, Ltd., 753 So. 2d 1219, 1223 (Fla. 1999);
Kawamata Farms, Inc. v. United Agri Prods., 948 P.2d 1055, 1095 (Haw. 1997). But see Staton Hills
Winery Co. v. Collons, 980 P.2d 784,790 n.5 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (citing nine cases in a string cite,
some decided before Saratoga Fishing and some after, where courts ruled against plaintiffs that had
attempted to characterize their economic losses as damage to "other property").
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hinted at in Irresponsibility that East River would encourage encroachment by
contract into tort more generally, beyond products liability,87 courts have
specifically kept the economic-loss limitation out of other commercial cases, and
preserved tort or tort-like claims in contexts that raise ambiguity on how to classify
the actions.88
In sum, what Davis makes of East River sounds excessive. "Product liability
law rests on the moral perception that the economic burdens of death or
incapacitation are too much for an individual," write three Florida practitioners in
thoughtful resistance to exempting individual plaintiffs from the harshness of the
economic loss rule. 9 But pro-plaintiff variations rewrite the economic loss rule
"into a norm for commercial transactions in which no one is injured."9 Davis,
unclear on exactly what it is she wants to remedy with liberalization, advocates an
"intermediate approach," which would have denied the plaintiffs claim in East
River but offered comfort in the form of encouraging dicta.9' Intermediate
compromises are certainly available. Courts couldpermit liability for economic loss
caused by a sudden accident, for instance, while disallowing claims for gently
sputtering failure or deterioration.92 They could permit recovery for economic loss
caused by an accident that could have injured a person, and only fortuitously did not
happen to do so. But such "intermediate" compromising begs the question of what
if anything is wrong with a straightforward no-recovery rule. "Ignoring the need for
empirical evidence of social need and effect, courts too often react automatically to
slogans of past product liability battles," conclude the Florida lawyers, summing up
economic-loss alarms. 94 "Overused, the Marseillaise has decayed into Muzak." 95
87. Davis does not make this claim directly about East River, but raises it in her discussion of
Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988), and the same reasoning might be applied to her
East River discussion. See Davis, supra note 2, at 1113-16.
88. See, e.g., Bohler-Uddeholm Am., Inc.v. Ellwood Group, Inc., 247 F. 3d 79, 104 (3d Cir.
2001) (expressing a preference for the more permissive "gist of the action test" rather than the more
stringent "economic loss test" in the context of breach of fiduciary duty); Norwalk Cove Marina, Inc.
v. S/V Odysseus, 90 F. Supp. 2d 190, 192 (D. Conn. 2000) (refusing to apply the East River
economic-loss limitation in the context of fraud).
89. Edward T. O'Donnell et al., On the Differences Between Blood and RedInk: A SecondLook
at the Policy Arguments for the Abrogation of the Economic Loss Rule in Consumer Litigation, 19
NOVA L. REv. 923, 964 (1995).
90. Id.
91. Davis, supra note 2, at 1086.
92. See Trans States Airlines v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 522, 525 (N.D. Ill.
1995) (identifying "sudden and calamitous" event as the touchstone of recovery for economic loss).
93. See Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1173 (3d Cir.
1981) (relied on by the Third Circuit in East River, 476 U.S. at 862); Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 575
P.2d 1383, 1387 (Or. 1978) (distinguishing between "endangered" and merely "disappointed" users
because only the former can recover for economic loss).
94. O'Donnell et al., supra note 89, at 964.
95. Id.
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B. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.
The Irresponsibility thesis finds much stronger support in Boyle v. United
Technologies Corp., where the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision revealing some
rancor among the Justices, held that "[1]iability for design defects in military
equipment cannot be imposed, pursuant to state law" in products liability actions
where three criteria are met: the federal government approved reasonably precise
specifications; the equipment that the defendant supplied conformed to the
specifications; and "the supplier warned the United States about the dangers in the
use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United States."96
On its surface, this holding might look like a simple extension of military immunity,
but Davis argues that it is much more sinister. Like East River, writes Davis, Boyle
menacingly returns to archaic immunities derived from contract, deeming the
procurement agreement and other relations between the government and the
contractor more important than a manufacturer's responsibility to a victim."7
Carrying out its immunity agenda, Davis contends, the Court has gone out of
its way to favor the "discretionary function exception," which attributes
responsibility for design decisions to the immune sovereign rather than a
contractor.98 A reader accepting the contract paradigm might agree that suppliers
hemmed in by procurement strictures should perhaps not face personal-injury
liability for defective design after they have duly complied with government orders.
However, enterprises "like McDonnell Douglas, Boeing, and General Dynamics"99
do not warrant this solicitude. They know at least as much about product design as
the Pentagon officials who award them their lucrative procurement contracts, and
their eagerness to feed at the Department of Defense trough-Davis uses another
term, "the cash cow"'9--suggests that they do not need tort immunity in order to
keep the nationprepared and defended."' As Justice Brennan remarked in his Boyle
dissent, military contractors had lobbied Congress hard to get this favor via
legislation; having failed in Congress, these enterprises relocated their campaign to
what proved to be a more hospitable forum for their rent-seeking, the United States
Supreme Court.' 2 There is no reason for the Court to give this constituency that
96. 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1986).
97. Davis, supra note 2, at 1096-99. Furthermore, in Boyle the Court rejected a better path: it
could have stayed within the confines of Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), is had many
courts of appeals in deciding government-contractor cases. Id. at 1094. Under the Feres doctrine,
service personnel may not use the Federal Tort Claims Act to recover from the United States for
injuries that arise during military service. Id. at 1094. See also id. at 1095-96 (suggesting other "pro-
recovery" routes that the Court could have taken).
98. Id. at 1094 &n.96.
99. Id. at 1096.
100. Id.
101. Justice Scalia nevertheless expressed concern on this point. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507
("The imposition of liability on Government contractors will directly affect the terms of Government
contracts: either the contractor will decline to manufacture the design specified by the Government,
or it vill raise its price.").
102. 487 U.S. at 515-16 & n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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much protection from liability, Davis maintains. 0 3 Apart from the substance of this
holding, Boyle is also troublesome as a matter of procedure; it adds to the girth of
federal common law, a corpus that ought to be expanded sparingly. 10 4
Davis next argues that the seeds of irresponsibility that Boyle sowed have
yielded a grim harvest in the lower courts. She mentions several developments.
First, although the Boyle holding was limited to design defects, courts have come
close to saying that some manufacturing defects are covered by the government
contractor defense. °5 Second, courts have applied the defense to non-military
suppliers of civilian goods, even though the Scalia opinion emphasized its focus on
military contexts. 106 Third, ambiguity in Boyle' s "reasonably precise specifications"
provision has been resolved in favor of defendants. 0 7 Fourth, in a kind of transition
to her preemption cases, Cipollone and Medtronic, Davis expresses concern about
the application of Boyle-style immunity to non-tort claims.' ° Because Boyle
identified a federal interest that outweighed or preempted state common law,
defendants have now enjoyed what Davis calls "a taste of immunity,"' 9 and so they
are keen to apply Boyle beyond the fairly narrow confines of government-contractor
tort law, thereby gaining access to "favorable federal law."110
Irresponsibility supports each of these assertions with case citations, but also
acknowledges contrary authority. A similar pattern of checkered development
continues in case law following the 1996 publication date. In these more recent
decisions judges have stated, for instance, that Boyle-style immunity can cover
manufacturing defects as well as design defects, but they usually consider
manufacturing-defect claims as part of a larger question of whether the defendant
supplied the product pursuant to "reasonably precise specifications" from the
government. This heuristic yields results in favor of both plaintiffs and
defendants."' The spreading of Boyle-style immunity beyond military contractors
103. Davis, supra note 2, at 1096. For arguments in support of the idea that Congress rather than
the courts should craft the government contractor defense, see Green & Matasar, supra note 36, at
642; Sean Watts, Note, Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. and the Government ContractorDefense:
An Analysis Based on the Current Circuit Split Regarding the Scope of the Defense, 40 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 687, 714-16 (1999).
104. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 517-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The stance hostile to federal
common law derives from Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("There is no federal
general common law.").
105. Davis, supra note 2, at 1099.
106. Id. at 1104-09.
107. Id. at 1109-13.
108. Id. at 1113-16.
109. Id. at 1114-15.
110. Id. at 1113-14.
111. See Snell v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 107 F.3d 744, 749 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that
although manufacturing defects as well as design defects are covered under the Boyle immunity rule,
the defendant would be denied the defense because the alleged defect did not fall within reasonably
precise specifications). Compare Roll v. Tracor, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1202 (D. Nev. 2000)
(defendant not entitled to summary judgment because the defect might have been a simple
manufacturing defect, outside government specifications) and Anzalone v. WesTech Gear Corp., 661
A.2d 796, 802 (N.J. 1995) (not cited in Irresponsibility) (defendant not entitled to summary judgment
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has indeed gained ground,"2 but one might question whether this constitutes real
spreading: Once the Supreme Court refused to rely on the Feres doctrine in Boyle
and instead used the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims
Act-a waiver of sovereign immunity that Boyle extended to benefit
nongovemment defendants-it becomes difficult to confine Boyle to its military-
based facts."' The Davis prediction that defendants will attempt to federalize
personal injury claims and use Boyle to remove cases to federal court has
encountered a mixed fate; such preemption/removal attempts frequently fail." 4 As
for the concern that Boyle would be overextended outside of tort law to spread
immunity among a wide class of business defendants, several post-1996 decisions
have rejected this defense-initiated effort." 5
There remains the general discursive point that although progeny cases both
favor and disfavor defendants who are greedy for immunity, Boyle sends atroubling
message about exemptions from tort liability thatbenefitpowerful corporate parties
and leave personal injuries unremedied where they fall. By way of response, a
passage from a case called Connor v. Quality Coach, Inc." 6 may be pertinent.
Driving a van that the defendant had furnished to the state pursuant to a vocational-
rehabilitation contract, Bruce Connor, a paraplegic man, suffered personal injuries
when his left hand was trapped in the brake-throttle control."7 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court refused to immunize the defendant for having supplied the van
under government contract and condemned Boyle as wrongheaded, too generous
to contractors:
We acknowledge the public policy relied upon by the United
States Supreme Court in Boyle ... namely, protection of the
public's interest in receiving competitive bids from contractors,
consequently lowering the government's procurement costs.
[However, this court finds] such a general policy statement,
because it did not establish compliancewithreasonably precise specifications) with Quiles v. Sikorsky
Aircraft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 154, 165-71 (D. Mass. 1999) (entering summary judgment in favor of the
defendant on all elements of the Boyle-formulated government contractor defense) and Russek v.
Unisys Corp., 921 F. Supp. 1277, 1290 (D. N.J. 1996) (defendant entitled to summary judgment
because it established compliance with reasonably precise specifications).
112. See Andrew v. Unisys Corp., 936 F. Supp. 821, 829-30 (W.D. Okla. 1996).
113. See Green & Matasar, supra note 35, at 684-85 (drawing this conclusion aboutBoyle before
post-Boyle case law developed).
114. Examples ofremands that followedunsuccessful removal attempts includeFaulkv. Owens-
CorningFiberglass Corp., 48 F. Supp. 2d 653,670 (E.D. Tex. 1999) andMcCormickv. C.E. Thurston
& Sons, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 400-01 (E.D. Va. 1997). But see Blackman v. Asbestos Defendants, No.
C-97-3066, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17821, at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (permitting removal).
115. See, e.g., Virginia Panel Corp. v. MACPanel Co., 139 F. Supp. 2d 753,758 n.6 (W.D. Va.
2001) (refusing to extend immunity in the context of patent litigation); Commonwealth v. Johnson
Insulation, 682 N.E. 2d 1323, 1329 (Mass. 1997) (refusing, in the context of abatement action by the
state against an asbestos supplier, to immunize the supplier against the state's claim that the defendant
breached the implied warranty of merchantability).
116. 750 A.2d 823 (Pa. 2000).
117. Id. at 824.
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lacking in empirical support, ill-suited to serve as a counterweight
to the policies favoring just compensation underlying our tort
system. Moreover, there are a range of other considerations that
would compete with protection of the government's economic
interests, not the least of which is that the insulation of the
Commonwealth from indirect costs on grounds of public interest
has the perverse effect of permitting a government officer to
minimize as a consideration in procurement decisions (at least as
a matter of financial concern) external societal costs, particularly
in terms of potential diminishment to public safety." 8
In sum, Boyle presents worthy yet not ironclad support for the claim that the
Supreme Court has been fostering irresponsibility in its products liability decisional
law. Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court indulged a defendant with sweeping
immunity, giving contractors even more favorable gains than what they were able
to buy from Congress during the Reagan era of military expansion, and helped to
immunize other defendants, notably nonmilitary suppliers of civilian goods. I
readily join Davis in deploring Boyle. Post-Irresponsibility case law, however,
offers a somewhat brighter picture of the Boyle aftermath than what Davis has
presented. Through judicious application of the "reasonable precise specifications"
criterion, courts appear to be holding military suppliers liable for manufacturing
defects, despite Davis's worry that manufacturing defect would be subsumed into
the immunity that now blankets design defect." 9 Even cases that entered summary
judgment for defendants have insisted the Boyle criteria add up to a conjunctive test
where the defendant has the burden of proof as to each element. 2 And the federal
appellate courts are lately divided, not united, on the application of Boyle to
nonmilitary suppliers.12' Responsibility goes head-to-head with irresponsibility,
resisting (though admittedly not defeating) the force of an unfortunate Supreme
Court precedent.
C. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. and Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr
Davis combines her discussion of these two preemption cases in the same
section," spending most of her time on Cipollone, perhaps because Medtronic was
brand new when she wrote her article. Medtronic may be disposed of right here. To
one who accepts the Davis perspective, this decision is a clear victory for the good
guys-a victory where a majority of the Justices could not come together to sign a
118. Id. at 834 (citations omitted).
119. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Quiles v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 154, 165-70 (D. Mass. 1999) (reciting
elements).
121. See generally Watts, supra note 103, at 695-702 (summarizing the split in the circuits).
122. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S.
470 (1992).
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single opinion for the Court, to be sure, but a ticket for the injured Lohr to litigate
her claim under the common law of a state with a national reputation for open-
handed juries,'" and apromisingprecedent formany otherpersons injuredby FDA-
approved medical devices.124 InMedtronic, a cardiac patient sued the manufacturer
of her pacemaker, alleging both negligence and strict liability under Florida law.1"
The Court held that her claims were not preempted by the Medical Device
Amendments (MDA) of 1976.126 In response to Medtronic's attempt to gain the
immunity of preemption, Justice Stevens, announcing the judgment for the Court,
snorted. "Medtronic's argument is not only unpersuasive," he wrote, "it is
implausible.""2 7
Why is Davis unhappy with this anti-irresponsibility result? First, she wants a
majority, or perhaps the entire Court, to support the injured plaintiff, not just a
rickety plurality."~ Second, as she writes, "[it is disheartening that in an area so
clearly related to public health and safety... five justices disagreed that unless
Congress unequivocally states its intent to disrupt state tort law remedies, it should
not be deemed to have intended to do so by judicial interpretation." 129 An embrace
of Justice Blackmun's separate opinion in Cipollone, which Justices Kennedy and
Souterhadsignedback in 1992,"' would have pleased Davis. 13 'The wish list seems
excessive, not to say "unpersuasive" and "implausible"-or at least unconvincing
in support of a thesis that the Supreme Court has been fostering irresponsibility.
Activists always want more support than they get. The distinction between acts and
omissions seems relevant here: Courts and other political actors that decline to join
123. For commentary describing Florida as apro-plaintiffjurisdiction with respect to personal-
injury claims, see Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1996: Tenth
AnnualSurvey, 45 AM.J. COMP.L. 447,481-82 (1997) (describing Floridapersonal-injury law as what
plaintiffs typically favor in the context of choice-of-law disputes); Harriet Chiang, West Coast Juries
Tough on Tobacco, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 14,2000, at A2 (noting that one of the firstjury verdicts against
a cigarette defendant came from Florida and reporting that a Miami jury awarded three plaintiffs $12
million as compensatory damages in April 2000).
124. Medtronic suffered another defeat in Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1373-77
(11 th Cir. 1999), where the Eleventh Circuit held that Florida-law design defect claims were not
preempted by FDA premarket approval of its pacemaker. See also Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., 111 F.3d
782, 789 (10th Cir. 1997) (deeming failure-to-warn claim not preempted by the Medical Device
Amendments); Stiffler v. Drake, 698 N.E.2d 1068, 1069-70 (Ohio. Ct. App. 1997) (dispatching the
preemption argument of a medical-device manufacturer with a citation to Medironic); Sowell v.
Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 656 N.Y.S.2d 16, 21 (App. Div. 1997) (holding that none of the plaintiff's
claims were preempted by the MDA).
125. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 480-81.
126. Id. at 502-03.
127. Id. at 487. This sentence appeared in a part of the Stevens opinion that drew only four
signatures, not the requisite five. However, it has been quoted approvingly in three federal court
opinions and three state court opinions. LEXIS searchperformed on Feb. 23, 2002. Ifoundithelpful
as a search term to find pro-plaintiff sequellae of Medtronic in case law.
128. Davis, supra note 2, at 1132.
129. Id. at 1134.
130. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 531 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
131. Davis, supra note 2, at 1132.
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an anti-irresponsibility cause are not by dint of this inaction guilty of encouraging
offenders "to be as irresponsible as far as they will go.' 32
Cipollone cannot be dispatched quite so fast as Medtronic. For Davis, this
decision, which held that the federal Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969
precluded the plaintiff from bringing a common law failure-to-warn claim against
a cigarette manufacturer, 3 3 marked an ominous departure.'34 In its 1980s decisions,
East River and Boyle, the Supreme Court had fomented irresponsibility, Davis
writes, but at least it did so within traditional federal-law confines: "admiralty and
national defense."'135 In 1992, however, the Court began its march on the common
law of torts.
This tocsin about imminent federal invasion into the common law is somewhat
overstated. Whereas Cipollone rested solidly on what the Court regarded as an
express mandate of Congress to eliminate common-law warning liability in cigarette
claims when the defendant provided the warnings Congress required, the lower-court
progeny of Cipollone have found the concept of express preemption shaky and
inconclusive, and so post-Cipollone decisional law by no means coheres around a
banner of irresponsibility. Less committed than Cipollone to the prospect of finding
expressly preemptive statutory language, post-1992 decisional law does not propose
to interpret statutory language as self-defining, and tends not to locate, or perhaps not
to look for, an explicit directive to preclude common-law claims.'36
Let us hew for the moment to the product at issue in Cipollone. Post-Cipollone
cigarette cases illustrate the difficulty of keeping plaintiffs from a jury and, more
generally, of nailing a plaintiff down with express-preemption statutory language.
Last year the Eighth Circuit held that most of a widower's case against the
manufacturer of the cigarettes his wife had smoked was not preempted, including
a defective design claim where the plaintiff proffered no reasonable alternative
design and a failure-to-warn claim based on pre-1969 marketing. '37 Another federal
court held that a plaintiff alleging injury by secondhand smoke may bring a failure-
132. Id. at 1139.
133. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 530-31.
134. Davis, supra note 2, at 1116-17.
135. Id.
136. It is now almost a truism that statutory interpretation does not consist of looking at words
and educing what these words must, self-evidently, always mean. See generally WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 11 (1994) (insisting that text changes its
meaning over time, as society changes); see also id. at 38 (acknowledging a differing view, associated
with the "new textualists," which looks for clear, ordinary meaning of words in a statute). For what
it's worth, LEXIS listed in its "Allrev" file 140 articles with "statutory interpretation" in the title
published after 1992, and only 57 with "statutory interpretation" in the title before 1992. Although
the earliest date of articles in "Allrev" varies depending on what day you search, the oldest "hit" in
the latter search has a publication date of 1970, meaning that in more than twice as many years (1970-
1991 versus 1993-early 2002) the law reviews available on the Lexis database appear to have
published less than half as many articles on this subject. LEXIS search performed on Feb. 23, 2002.
Even allowing for the expanding roster of law review articles on every subject, it seems reasonable
to infer that the task of finding preemption in a statute has grown more complex and uncertain since
Cipollone.
137. Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 260 F.3d 837, 842, 846 (8th Cir. 2001).
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to-warn claim, even though a claim by the smoker himself would have been
preempted.138 Another court refused to deem preempted a failure-to-warn claim
from a plaintiff who bought the defendant's loose tobacco and rolled his own
cigarettes,139 even though legal and public-health communities site most of the
relevant danger in tobacco and its additives, little of it in cigarette paper or filters.
Away from the personal injury context, the First Circuit determined that a
Massachusetts law requiring cigarette manufacturers to disclose additives and
nicotine ratings to the state public health department was not preempted.4
Alongside these cases, cigarette plaintiffs have sustained losses on the preemption
front. 4' But the outcome is mixed, a result of considerable judicial latitude and,
perhaps, a widespread public antipathy to the cigarette industry that grew stronger
in the years following the Cipollone decision.42
Away from the cigarette context, something resembling a centrist compromise
has formed around preemption. Courts following Cipollone have purported to
balance state and federal interests, although a remark that the Court published in
2000 may have started to discourage them from the practice. 43 And a "presumption
against pre-emption"-which Cipollone reaffirmed,"4 and which four dissenting
Justices deemed crucial in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.14 -- is still
available (though admittedly difficult to measure) for those who want to invoke
it.'46
Savings clauses matter. In typical cases, courts will weigh a specific federal
mandate--such as the provision in the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act of 1966 that "no State shall have authority" to establish a standard not
"identical to the Federal standard"' 4 7-against a clause in the statute, often a
provision stating that compliance with the federal safety standard does not exempt
138. Shaw v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 973 F. Supp. 539,543-47 (D. Md. 1997).
139. Toolev. Brown &Williamson Tobacco Corp., 980 F. Supp. 419, 422-24 (N.D. Ala. 1997).
140. Philip Morris Inc.. v. Harshbarger, 122 F.3d 58, 77 (1st Cir. 1997). But see Jones v.
Vilsack, 272 F.3d 1030, 1039 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding public health initiative by the Iowa state
government largely preempted).
141. See, e.g., Johnson v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 122 F. Supp. 2d 194, 201-02
(D. Mass. 2000) (reading Cipollone to preempt any claim with respect to public communications that
the defendant should have made, but deeming several other claims notpreempted); Magnus v. Fortune
Brands, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 2d 217, 223 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (deeming post-1969 warning claims pre-
empted).
142. See Tiffany S. Griggs, Comment, Medicaid Reimbursementfrom Tobacco Manufacturers:
Is the States' Legal Position Equitable?, 69 U. CoLo. L. REv. 799,799 (1998) (noting that the tobacco
industry "incurred the wrath of the public in the 1990s").
143. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861,873-74 (2000) (disparaging the attempt
"to distinguish among types of federal-state conflict for purposes of analyzing whether such a conflict
warrants pre-emption in a particular case").
144. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 470, 518 (1992).
145. Geier, 529 U.S. at 886, 907-10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146. But see Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L.
REv. 967, 1013-14 (2002).
147. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1970) (now covered under 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101 etseq. (1994)).
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any person from liability under the common law. 4' When the mandate meets the
savings clause, sometimes the plaintiff finds herself preempted out of court,
sometimes not. The opportunity to use a savings clause to counter even an explicitly
preemptive mandate received encouragement from the Supreme Court in Geier,149
where Justice Breyer's opinion for the Court stated that a savings clause in a statute
must be understood to have some meaning; every savings clause must save
something. 5 ° In a kind of inversion of this common paradigm, other statutes
contain no expressly preemptive mandate, but also no savings clause. Here again,
courts divide. Some accept the implied-preemption label that defendants encourage;
others decline to find any preemptive effect in the statute.''
Preemption under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA)5 2 provides stronger support for the Davis thesis, but even there courts
have found room to maneuver, and the overall outcome does not warrant the word
irresponsibility. Enacted in 1947 and later amended in light of environmental
concerns, FIFRA established a comprehensive scheme for the registration, labeling,
and packaging of pesticides 53 The scheme has considerable rigor. Rather than
bestow on sellers a warning formulation resembling Congress's plush-quilted gift
blanket to those who profit from the sale of cigarettes, FIFRA obliges the
manufacturer to register each pesticide with the Environmental Protection Agency,
along with its own proposed warning, which the agency reviews for adequacy to
protect health and the environment.s 4 States are expressly prohibited from imposing
other duties with respect to labeling or packaging of registered pesticides, and the
savings clause expressly purports to save only other state regulation, not tort
liability.515  FIFRA is a formidable preemptor. Courts typically refuse to hear
failure-to-warn tort claims about registered pesticides.5 6 But a few plaintiffs do get
148. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1994) (retaining common-law liability).
149. Geier, 529 U.S. at 869.
150. "The savings clause assumes that there are some significant number of common-law
liability cases to save." Id. at 868.
151. Litigation about the Virus-Serum-Toxin Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 151-159 (2000), a statute
regulating veterinary vaccines, provides an example of mixed results in the context of implied
preemption/no savings clause. Compare Lynnbrook Farms v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 79 F.3d
620,630(7th Cir. 1996) (holding the plaintiffs claim preempted) with Sjovall v. SmithKline Beecham
Corp. 16 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1119 (D. S.D. 1997) (holding some claims not preempted) and Garrelts
v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 943 F. Supp. 1023, 1070 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (holding the plaintiff's
claim not preempted). SmithKline Beecham has won some preemption immunity in the heartland, lost
some. If I were its general counsel, I would not feel "immunized," Davis, supra note 2, at 1081, so
to speak, with respect to my vaccines.
152. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1994).
153. Id. § 136a. The major amendments, in 1972 and 1988, recognized pesticides as dangerous
beyond the context of direct-contact poisoning. See Brian M. Brown, Note, Federal Preemption of
State Tort Law Failure to Warn Claims by FIFRA: Injury Without Relief., 4 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 147,
148-49 (1995) (providing a concise history of the statute).
154. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a),(c).
155. Id. § 136v(b).
156. See M. Stuart Madden, Federal Preemption of Inconsistent State Safety Obligations, 21
PACE L. REv. 103, 120-29 (2000) (summarizing cases).
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through the preemption mesh.' s Pesticide manufacturers, in short, work within a
system that has a good reputation for consumer protection,' unlike the notorious
cigarette-labeling statutes, and do not turn the regulatory scheme into an
impermeable shield against failure-to-warn litigation.
To conclude the discussion of Cipollone and Medtronic, it is worth
mentioning-at least Justice Stevens found it worth mentioning in his Medtronic
opinion-that the Supreme Court did not extinguish all of Antonio and Rose
Cipollone's common-law claims.'"9 Their families continued the litigation, and ten
years later it seems evident that Cipollone did not significantly obstruct-it may
even have encouraged-the pursuit of redress for cigarette-caused personal injury.
Multi-million dollar jury verdicts against cigarette defendants are now everyday
headlines; cigarette smokers are rapidly being blown out of public spaces; and
secondhand smoke, whether a real menace or not, has acquired a real hold in public
discourse. Although the Cipollone decision may have seemed broad ten years ago,
persons injured and imperiled by cigarette smoke have found many routes around
it. However better the law would have been if Cipollone had gone the way Justices
Blackmun, Kennedy, and Souter preferred, the decision did not directly beget broad
new immunity for defendants, neither in its holding nor its progeny.
Notwithstanding these don't-worry, the-glass-is-half-full encouraging counter-
developments to the preemption phenomenon, however, I would conclude that the
weight of preemption case law comports with the Irresponsibility thesis. While
defendants claiming preemption do not enjoy an impermeable shield, they have
been given dispensations from the common law that probably exceed what
Congress intended to give them-putting aside the question of whether it is a good
idea for the Court, beginning with Cipollone, to have set up Congress in theimmunity-granting (or -selling) business. 160 An observer needs faith in the power
157. See, e.g., Jeffers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 775, 784 (S.D. W. Va. 2000)
(deeming packaging claims not preempted, labeling claims preempted); Burke v. Dow Chem. Co., 797
F. Supp. 1128,11-41 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (parsing FIFRA finely to conclude that not all warning claims
are preempted); Burt v. Fumigation Serv. & Supply, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 624, (W.D. Mich. 1996)
(permitting design-defect claim with respect to foreseeable misuse); Gorton v. Am. Cyanamid Co.,
533 N.W.2d 746, 755 (Wis. 1995) (allowing claim for misrepresentation); Malone v. Am. Cyanamid
Co., 649 N.E.2d 493,498-99 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (allowing claim for breach of implied warranty in
advertising). But see Kuiper v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 913 F. Supp. 1236, 1245 (E.D. Wis. 1996)
(deeming misrepresentation claim preempted, on facts virtually identical to Gorton).
158. See, e.g., School Pesticide Provision: Hearing on H.RI Before the House Subcomm. on
Dep't Operations, Oversight, Nutrition, & Firestry, Comm. on Agric., 107th Cong. 14-30, 68-79
(2001) (statement of Jay Feldman, Executive Director, Beyond Pesticides/National Coalition Against
the Misuse of Pesticides) (available on LEXIS) (praising FIFRA while advocating additional
regulation of pesticides for the protection of school-age children); Jeffrey Winograd, EPA Authority
Under Clean Air ActArgued Before Supreme Court, PESTICIDE & ToXIc CHEM. NEws, Nov. 9,2000
(available on LEXIS) (reporting environmentalists' concern about the EPA's future power to enforce
FIFRA, implying some satisfaction with current enforcement practice).
159. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,488 (1996).
160. On whether the Court did anything so bold, see Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S.
504, 534-39 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting) (noting the lack of precedent behind
themajority's decision that "common-law damages actions exert aregulatory effect on manufacturers
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of regulation to believe that safety is improved, or at least not jeopardized, by
legislation that imposes safety-related duties on manufacturers while also being
understood to preempt common law tort claims.16' In his celebrated article on
deterrence, Gary Schwartz established that such simple faith is unnecessary for a
belief in the power of litigation: his review of the literature found that products
liability is indeed a source of deterrence and therefore safety, albeit not too much
of it. 6 ' No study such as his permits the citizenry to rest easy because of public-
health statutes or regulations that have been deemed to preempt the common law
of torts. Davis is right to worry about the preemption law that Cipollone has
begotten. More scholars should share her concerns.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT AND OUR CULTURE OF IRRESPONSIBILITY REVISITED:
SOME PRO-RESPONSIBILITY SUPREME COURT HOLDINGS
Not every Supreme Court decision on products liability is a source of
irresponsibility. The previous Part has acquitted two out of Davis's four cases of
this charge and deemed the more sinister decisions, Boyle and Cipollone, less
menacing than Davis had contended, especially in light of case law that appeared
after her article was published. This Part rounds out the discussion of the Supreme
Court as a products liability court by describing some of its other holdings,
thematically rather than case-by-case. This review suggests that the Court has been
building some pro-responsibility decisional law.
A. Concern for Absent Claimants in Products Liability Class Actions
Products liability scholars have long noted that one cannot readily generalize
about "products liability" from asbestos claims. This particular injurious product
may be unique. 63 No survey of products liability in the United States Supreme
analogous to that of positive enactments"). See also Davis, supra note 146, at 997-1005.
161. Cf Sowell v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 656 N.Y.S.2d 16,21 (App. Div. 1997) ("[T]he mere
fact that a product has received [premarketing approval from the FDA], a procedure that was instituted
for the purpose of benefitting and protecting consumers, is not a reason to forever shield its
distributors from State tort actions based on harm caused by the product.").
162. Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really
Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REv. 377,405-13 (1994).
163. In celebrated writings on "the quiet revolution" in products liability, Theodore Eisenberg
and James A. Henderson, Jr. excluded asbestos cases from their empirical assessments. See Theodore
Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 731, 742 n.40 (1992); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in
Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REv. 479, 521-22 (1990)
(noting methological decision to exclude asbestos); see also Bernstein, supra note 36, at 3 n.7 (noting
anomalous status of abatement litigation within the "products liability" category); Michael Rustad,
In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data,
78 IowAL. REV. 1, 50-51 (1992) (summarizing data onproducts liability litigation, excluding asbestos
cases).
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Court, however, can ignore Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor 64 and Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp.,' two significant decisions from the products docket.
When the Court struck down asbestos class settlements as violative of Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, once in 1997 and again in 1999, it
grounded its holdings in determinations that the interests of absent class members
were not adequately represented in the settlements. 66 In both Amchem and Ortiz,
the Court sided with objectors and against a forceful alliance between high-power
class-action litigators and corporations that had manufactured asbestos. 67 Justice
Ginsburg, writing for the Court inAmchem, faulted the settling parties for reaching
a "compromise with no structural assurance of fair and adequate representation for
the diverse groups and individuals affected."' 68 Taking an even sharper stance,
Justice Souter for the Court in Ortiz noted the petitioners' demand that the entire
class action be deemed nonjusticiable: the petitioners, who retained the eminent
Laurence Tribe to speak for them in the Supreme Court, described the claim as a
"feigned" class action that the defendant Fibreboard initiated "to control its future
asbestos tort liability, with the 'vast majority' of the 'exposure-only' class members
being without injury in fact and hence without standing to sue."'16 9 Justice Souter's
tone implied that he credited the accusation, a strong choice of words to attack the
asbestos defendant as having sought undeserved-indeed, unlawful-shelter from
liability.
Inasmuch as pro-plaintiff and pro-defendant scholar-spectators have lined up
on both sides of the class action controversy, 7' it would be imprudent to celebrate
Amchem and Ortiz as clear victories for those who, like Davis, decry
irresponsibility on the part of business enterprises. Yet the premises that Davis
expresses in Irresponsibility appear shared to a great measure in both opinions for
the Court. Recall that Davis describes the Supreme Court as fostering immunity by
overextending and overapplying federal rights as shields against the justice that
common-law litigation renders to injured persons.' This aspect of the
Irresponsibility thesis-federal products liability law retrogressive, state products
liability law progressive-emerges for Davis most strongly in the rise of
164. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
165. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
166. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 622-28; Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 854-56.
167. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 591; Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 864.
168. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627.
169. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 831.
170. See, e.g., George L. Priest, Procedural Versus Substantive Controls of Mass Tort Class
Actions, 26 J. LEGAL STuD. 521, 553 (1997) (favoring class actions that exclude potentially
meritorious future claims when including them would impose over-deterrrence on defendants); David
Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARv.
L. REV. 831 passim (2002) (favoring the class action side of the dispute, rather than the objector side,
on the ground that injured persons achieve better results by aggregating their claims rather than
pursuing them separately). The question of which side of this dispute makes the more attractive
arguments is well explored in Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass
Tort Class Action, 115 HARv. L. REV. 747, 784-95 (2002).
171. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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preemption, as set forth in Cipollone.12 In this context, Amchem and Ortiz, which
each struck down "an aspiration to replace the tort system with a private
administrative regime," ' take a stand in favor of tort litigation brought by and in
behalf of injured individuals.
B. Pro-Plaintiff Outcomes in the Maritime Cases
Following the publication of Irresponsibility, the Supreme Court decided two
products liability actions brought to the Court under admiralty jurisdiction. In both
cases, the Court favored the injured party rather than the injurer. Saratoga Fishing
Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., as mentioned above, distinguished East River and
permitted the plaintiffto recover for property damage.'74 Along the way in Saratoga
Fishing Co., the Court also condemned the Ninth Circuit's contrary holding as
bestowing too much "immunity" on a wrongdoer, reiterated that an "important
purpose of defective-product tort law is to encourage the manufacture of safer
products," expressed a need to maintain this "basic incentive," and asked
rhetorically why the Court should permit a series of resales to "progressively
immunize a manufacturer to an ever greater extent from the liability for foreseeable
physical damage that would otherwise fall upon it[.]"
In the othermaritime decision, YamahaMotor Corp. v. Calhoun, atwelve-year-
old resident of Pennsylvania was killed in an accident while on vacation in Puerto
Rico.'76 She had been riding ajet ski manufactured by the defendant.'77 Her parents
filed a wrongful death action in Pennsylvania.178 Yamaha argued that her damages
were limited by the federal maritime law of wrongful death.'79 No, held the
Supreme Court; those limited remedies "relate to ships and the workers who serve
them, and to a distinctly maritime substantive concept-the unseaworthiness
doctrine.""' The decision was unanimous.
C. Expert Evidence in a Benign Light
Both case law and commentary could be invoked to support the contention that
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. should join the Irresponsibility
foursome."8 ' The 1993 decision is curiously omitted from Davis's 1996 article,
perhaps because early commentary onDauberthad deemed the decision liberal, and
172. See Davis, supra note 2, at 1116-35.
173. Nagareda, supra note 170, at 783.
174. 520 U.S. 875, 876-77 (1997); see supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
175. Saratoga Fishing Co., 520 U.S. at 880-81.
176. 516 U.S. 199, 202 (1996).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 203.
180. Id. at 213.
181. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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thus contrary to the Irresponsibility thesis." 2 Addressing the plaintiffs' fervid
straggle against the prospect of summary judgment for the manufacturing
defendant, Justice Blackmun purported to replace a restrictive evidentiary rule
about expert testimony, the "general acceptance test," with a multi-factor balance
permitting testimony that falls short of a general-acceptance standard." 3 He
probably felt pity for the plaintiffs, children born with birth defects.8 4
Around the time that Davis published her article, however, Daubert began to
take on apro-defendant air. In 1995, the Daubertplaintiffs lost onremand."' Judge
Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit, affirming summary judgment in favor of the
defendant, wrote a much-cited opinion condemning the testimony the plaintiffs had
tried to introduce as neither valid nor relevant, contrary to the rigors of Rule 702 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence.16 The next year, Judge Posner wrote two opinions
for the Seventh Circuit that James Henderson and Aaron Twerski characterize "as
setting a strenuous standard against which to judge scientific expert testimony."'87
The Daubert decision did no harm to the then-newish concept of "junk science;"
this term grew more prevalent and popular, not less, after 1993.8' The Supreme
Court's revisits to Daubert in the late 1990s, General Electric Co. v. Joiner8 9 and
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,9 ' both affirmed the decisions of trial judges to
exclude expert testimony on behalf of plaintiffs.
And yet Daubert remains a liberal decision and a force for responsibility rather
than irresponsibility. Even assuming that some types of testimony admissible before
Daubert became inadmissible in jurisdictions that follow the decision-and many
states reject the holding,'9' notably California where it was first filed-it is not
inherently illiberal or irresponsible to hold expert witnesses to standards. The
executive officer of Toxic Products Inc. who at his country club or the Business
Roundtable excoriates what he calls junk science is a familiar trope, but one can
182. See, e.g., Effie J. Chan, Note, The "Brave New World" ofDaubert: True Peer Review,
Editorial Peer Review, and Scientific Validity, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 100, 110 (1995) (declaring, a bit
prematurely, that Daubert "settled the long-standing debate over the desirability of a conservative
versus liberal admissibility standard").
183. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587-89. See generally Daniel J. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32 GA.
L. REV. 699 (1998) (casting "general acceptance" as conservative and Daubert as liberal).
184. Cf. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 213 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Poor Joshua!').
185. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1322 (9th Cir. 1995).
186. Id. at 1315-20.
187. JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TwERsKi, PRODUCrS LIABILITY: PROBLEMS AND
PROCESS 156 (4th ed. 2000) (referencingRosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316 (7th Cir. 1996) and
Braun v. LorillardInc., 84 F.3d 230 (7th Cir. 1996)).
188. Two Australian commentators offer a critical history of the concept ofjunk science, with
detailed reference to Daubert. Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Trashing "Junk Science," 1998 STAN.
TECH. L. REv. 3, at http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/98_STLR_3/index.htm (last visited Mar. 29,
2002).
189. 522U.S. 136, 142(1997).
190. 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999).
191. See David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye Again: The Past, Present, and Future of the General
Acceptance Test, 41 JuomMrRucs J. 485 (2001).
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also envision an antitrust defendant trying to introduce a novel theory that would
demonstrate its limited market power, and failing because of Daubert.'
92
Prosecutors enjoy Daubert because it supports the introduction of DNA evidence,
which bolsters their convictions; rape trauma syndrome, frequently excluded under
Daubert, would help them get more convictions. 193
In my view, the Court's trilogy of expert-evidence cases stands for an
endorsement of the trial judge as the proper decisionmaker with respect to complex,
technical matters. It empowers not appellate judges, who are rendered nearly
impotent by Joiner's abuse-of-discretion standard; 94 not juries; not expert
witnesses, the slick and the inarticulate alike; not lawyers, not parties, and certainly
not the Supreme Court. Nor, for that matter, the experts-legislators, regulators,
peer reviewers, or elite communities in science. As Justice Blackmun understood,
there can be no alternative to someone's having power over complex cases.
Assigning much of this authority to the trial judge seems at least as sensible and
responsible as letting anyone else have it.
V. CONCLUSION
Simultaneously reflecting and fostering an expanded national interest in
product-caused injury, the Supreme Court has in recent decades come into its own
as a products liability court. In a development parallel to what commentators
describe as having taken place in other areas of the law, the Court has been a force
for conservatism in products liability. 9 5 Mary Davis argued masterfully back in
1996 that the Court has crafted a pro-defendant federal law regarding product-
caused injury.'96 This new federal law sometimes will immunize business
192. Andrew E. Taslitz, Interpretive Method and the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Call for a
Politically Realistic Hermeneutics, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 329, 375 (1995).
193. Id. I recently had a conversation with an engineer that supported Taslitz's point. This
engineer, who testifies frequently as an expert in road accident reconstruction, told me he is pleased
that Daubert obstructs his erstwhile chief competitors-police officers and state highway patrol
troopers. These "expert" witnesses were often utterly ignorant about such basics as how to estimate
vehicular speed from the appearance of skid marks. They would generate massive quantities of
inaccurate testimony, which juries too readily accepted out of deference to law enforcement officers,
in the pre-Daubert era. It is now easy to keep these law enforcement not-so-experts out of court, said
the happy engineer. Others believe Daubert has not solved the problem, however. See Mark Hansen,
Dr. Cop on the Stand, A.B.A. J., May 2002, at 31,34 (quoting evidence scholar David Faigman: "I
think the courts roll over when police officers are proffered as experts.")
194. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142-43 (1997).
195. On conservative tendencies in other fields of the law, away from the more headline-
grabbing criminal and constitutional law docket, see Robert F. Blomquist, Witches' Brew: Some
Synoptical Reflections on the Supreme Court's Dangerous Substance Discourse, 1790-1998, 43 ST.
LouIs U. L.J. 297, 323-26 (1999) (attacking the stance of the Court on questions of environmental
regulation); Michael E. Solimine, The Quiet Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 73 TuL. L. REv. 1,
39 & n.64 (1998) (borrowing a title from Henderson & Eisenberg, see supra note 163, to note a
development, similar to the pro-defendant trend in products liability, againstplaintiffs in the Supreme
Court's decisional law on personal jurisdiction).
196. See supra Part III.
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enterprises from liability, reduce their damages on those occasions when they do
have to pay something, and promote the notion that encouraging returns on capital
investment is more important than fostering safety and compensation for victims or
potential victims of dangerous products.
Those who judge the Court as a products liability court, however, owe it some
procedural fairness. For this reason I have undertaken a kind of pocket-part update
to Irresponsibility, reviewing decisional law-some from the Supreme Court itself.
The review adds twenty-one new Supreme Court decisions to a survey that Davis
began withjust four. Many of the newer Supreme Court decisions-among them
Saratoga Fishing Co. v. JM. Martinac & Co., Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun,
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Corp., Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor, Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.-come out pro- rather than anti-
responsibility." Space constraints prohibited full discussion in this Essay of more
ambiguous cases (such as BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore and Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co.) that were mentioned in passing;' here I can only
provide my bottom line, which is that no opinion from the Court since Cipollone
in 1992 can be read as fostering "our culture of irresponsibility." Moreover, a
review of the progeny of Davis's cases suggests that although these four decisions
provide a vehicle for lower-court judicial irresponsibility, many courts have been
vigorously resisting defense attempts to gain immunity through these holdings.' 99
The thesis about corporate irresponsibility holds strong when applied to two of
Davis's cases. Boyle bestowed gifts on business defendants: a share in the
discretionary function exception, which ought to belong entirely to government
actors; an extension of military-related immunity to the civilian context, which does
not need it; and perhaps some other unwarranted favors as well, such as an
extension of design-defect immunity to claims of manufacturing defect, although
the evidence there is thin. Cipollone invaded the domain of the common law by
equating tort damages with state "regulation," thereby making the shelter of
preemption available to those corporate parties that can persuade Congress to write
statutes their way. As I sign off on this Essay in the spring of 2002, it appears that
Davis's early warnings about preemption have been borne out by a host of
developments, starting with the campaign finance concerns aired in the late 1990s
through the Americanscandale dujour, Enron, aparable about what happens when
accountants, consulting firms, lawyers, regulators, high-level politicians, and the
very content of regulatory standards are all available for sale to the same
entrepreneurial buyer. Common law tort courts have long provided a safer haven
from the corruption that can accompany the making of statutes and regulations;
among institutional actors, judges are relatively likely to treat injured persons
fairly.211 Post-Cipollone preemption law has made this bulwark much less secure.
197. See supra notes 164-93 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 50, 174-93 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 114-21, 136-58 and accompanying text.
200. See Richard L. Abel, Questioning the Counter-majoritarian Thesis: The Case of Torts, 49
DEPAUL L. REV. 533, 533-39 (1999).
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Let us conclude with a word about "our culture., 20 ' Beyond the holdings of
cases, the Supreme Court has been a presence in products liability. In the last
twenty-five years this field has manifested a growing struggle among various
sectors-juries, judges, state legislatures, Congress, scholars, the
Restatement-over the power to determine outcomes in products liability actions.
Products law has also sought to balance looking forward, toward safety, against
looking backward, to determine liability. In its numerous products liability
decisions, the Supreme Court has joined and widened the field. Its participation has
helped Americans understand this subject as political and fundamental.
Mary Davis reminds us that "[w]hen the Supreme Court speaks, all people
listen." 2 Indeed. And by taking products liability seriously-and giving space to
its politics, policy ambitions, consequences-the Court weighs in on a subject of
great interest. For fifty years, the Justices have been underscoring the importance
of modem products liability law as a source of social progress. 203 We in the
products liability community are indebted to the Court for having dramatized some
hard questions of our field in twenty-five high-stakes, tough-call disputes. No one
word-and certainly not the word "irresponsibility"--sums up this case law: In the
Supreme Court, one party's "immunity" is another party's freedom. What Davis
201. Davis, supra note 2.
202. Id. at 1077.
203. See, e.g., Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., Inc., 376
U.S. 315, 318 (1964) (noting with approval the "'manufacturer's warranty of the soundness of its
manufactured product"'); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,313-16 (1980)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (proposing that the law ofpersonal jurisdiction be liberalized regarding suits
about "a product whose utility derives from its mobility"); see also supra notes 174-75 and
accompanying text (noting endorsement of products liability principles in Saratoga Fishing).
Of the Justices who participated in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953), the three
dissenters-Jackson, Black, and Frankfurter-stand higher in posterity than the five-man majority
(Reed, Vinson, Burton, Minton, and Warren). In Dalehite, the dissent included a paean to strict
products liability, reminiscent of Roger Traynor's famous Escola concurrence:
This is a day of synthetic living, when to an ever-increasing extent our
population is dependent upon mass producers for its food and drink, its cures
and complexions, its apparel and gadgets. These no longer are natural or simple
products but complex ones whose composition and qualities are often secret.
Such a dependent society must exact greater care than in more simple days and
must require from manufacturers or producers increased integrity and caution as
the only protection of its safety and well-being. Purchasers cannot try out drugs
to determine whether they kill or cure. Consumers cannot test the youngster's
cowboy suit or the wife's sweater to see if they are apt to burst into fatal flames.
Carriers, by land or by sea, cannot experiment with the combustibility of goods
in transit. Where experiment or research is necessary to determine the presence
or the degree of danger, the product must not be tried out on the public, nor must
the public be expected to possess the facilities or the technical knowledge to
learn for itself of inherent but latent dangers. The claim that a hazard was not
foreseen is not available to one who did not use foresight appropriate to his
enterprise.
Forward-looking courts, slowly but steadily, have been adapting the law of
negligence to these conditions.
Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 51-52 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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praises as "responsibilities"24 just might be violations of the United States
Constitution."' The debates continue. Products liability discussions have grown
stronger and more interesting, I think, with the help of attention from an important
court.
20 6
204. Davis, supra note 2, at 1078-79.
205. The personal-jurisdiction products liability cases provide an example of "irresponsibility"
as the flip side of due process. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113-16
(1987) (holding that the manufacturer of tire valve assemblies could not be sued for injuries resulting
from a motorcycle accident in California, because the actions of the offshore defendant did not
establish state court jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S.
at 299 (holding Volkswagen immune from suit in Oklahoma because of its lack of contacts to the
state). I elaborate on the tradeoffs between what might be called "freedom" and "security" in Anita
Bernstein, The Communities That Make Standards of Care Possible, 77 CHI-KENT L. REV.
(forthcoming 2002).
206. The great feature of this attention is that it has not hardened into centralized authority. In
his warning about funneling many more products liability problems to the Supreme Court, Gary
Schwartz warned that once the Court decided "some particular products liability issue, as a practical
matter that decision would probably remain unreviewable forperhaps a generation." Schwartz, supra
note 1, at 946. As one products liability court among others, a Court that declines to act Supreme in
products liability by, for instance, refusing certiorari formost cases, see id. at 944-45-the Courtjoins
a conversation without overpowering it.
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6. Gen. Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
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8. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875 (1997).
9. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
10. BMW of North Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
11. Hercules Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417 (1996).
12. Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996).
13. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995).
14. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
15. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
16. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
17. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257
(1989).
18. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
19. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
20. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
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21. MeDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984).
22. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
23. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
24. Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S.
315 (1964).
25. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
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